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Abstract
We study the importance of the local elite as a determinant of the
e⁄ectiveness of foreign aid in developing countries. An "extractive"
elite will misuse aid ￿ ows, an issue that is probably as old as foreign aid
itself. We proxy for the existence of an "extractive" elite by using an
historically determined variable: the percentage of European settlers
in colonial times. Our econometric results clearly show the importance
of this factor and its robustness to a wide set of alternative aid-growth
relationships advanced in the literature.
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21 Introduction
The e⁄ectiveness of foreign aid in developing countries is a topic that has
kept researchers in economics busy in the recent years. While the subject is
by no means a new one1, a recent revival took place in which the question
has shifted from "Is aid bene￿cial?" to "Under what conditions can aid be
expected to be bene￿cial?". In econometric terms this is traduced by the
inclusion of interaction terms between aid and other factors that can a⁄ect
the e⁄ectiveness of aid in a growth-regressions framework.
The most in￿ uential work along these lines is the one by Burnside and
Dollar (2000). These authors￿claim, that aid increases economic growth in
countries with good ￿scal, monetary and trade policies, sent shock waves
throughout the concerned policy circles2. The result of Burnside and Dollar
(2000) is provocative, but further research was quick to point out a lack of
robustness in their regressions3. While the policies-aid e⁄ectiveness relation-
ship advanced by these authors can be cast into doubt, it is clear that their
work has inspired many others in an attempt to understand the conditions
under which foreign aid is most bene￿cial.
Thanks to a vibrant research production, we can now relate the e⁄ective-
ness of aid to several factors. First, a seemingly robust ￿nding is that there
are diminishing returns to aid. In econometric terms this is re￿ ected in a
negative coe¢ cient on an aid squared term whenever it is included in growth
regressions (Dalgaard and Hansen 2001, Hansen and Tarp 2001, Lensink and
White 2001).
Aid also seems to matter more in the presence of large negative shocks.
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) construct an index for environmental vul-
nerability, which includes the variability of agricultural production and the
1See Hansen and Tarp (2000) for a review of three decades of literature on the subject.
2See Easterly (2003) for an account and discussion.
3See, in particular, Easterly et al. (2004).
3trend and variability of the terms of trade. They ￿nd that countries suf-
fering from high environmental vulnerability grow slower but also that aid
is more e⁄ective in them. A related result is obtained by Collier and Dehn
(2001), who study periods characterized by a negative terms of trade shock
(de￿ned as those located at the bottom 2.5% of the distribution). Their
results suggest that aid can be particularly important during these periods.
A di⁄erent situation in which aid might be of great use is in the years
following an armed con￿ ict. Collier and Hoe› er (2002) study such episodes
and advance that the growth e⁄ect of aid is strongest between 4 and 7 years
after the end of a con￿ ict, reverting then to its normal value. This suggest
that the bulk of aid ￿ ows should not arrive immediately after the con￿ ict,
when the country does not have the capacity to allocate it properly, but a
few years afterwards.
A ￿nal factor that appears to be strongly related to the e⁄ectiveness of
aid is the climate. Dalgaard et al. (2004) include the fraction of land in
the tropics in their growth regressions and show that their interaction with
aid has a strong negative e⁄ect, while the e⁄ect of other factors such as
macroeconomic policies tend to disappear with its inclusion. Roodman et al.
(2004), after carefully testing several competing factors, ￿nd that the fraction
of land in the tropics is one of the best predictors of aid (in)e⁄ectiveness.
We contribute to this empirical literature by concentrating on a factor
which seems to be understudied with respect to its obvious importance: the
role of the local elite. By elite we understand a relatively small part of the
population with a disproportionate share of the country￿ s political and eco-
nomic power. Aid ￿ ows cannot be converted into the goods and services they
have been allocated for without the intermediation of the local government
and local ￿rms, themselves under the control of this elite. Thus, the attitudes
and incentives of the elite are crucial and will determine how much of the aid
is diverted and how much reaches its ￿nal goal.
4A downside of the empirical literature on aid e⁄ectiveness is that the
mechanisms behind the statistical relationships are not necessarily well un-
derstood or explicitly spelled out. We believe that the role of the local elite
stands out by having a simple and unambiguous working mechanism whose
importance is rather uncontroversial. An "extractive" elite will simply use
aid to ￿nance its own consumption or its pet projects by taking advantage
of the fungibility of aid ￿ ows4. Countries that have the bad luck of being
governed by this type of elite will see their aid ￿ ows largely wasted.
Compare this straightforward link with the much-talked role of macro-
economic policies from Burnside and Dollar (2000). As far as we can tell,
these authors have not claimed that low in￿ ation, government surpluses or
openness to trade per se will make aid more e⁄ective. In￿ ation might be
problematic if it increases uncertainty and reduces the incentives to invest,
but this does not mean that aid given for building schools will be wasted.
Trade barriers can be harmful by not allowing a country to specialize in what
it does best, but how is this related to the allocation of aid to the people who
really need it? As it turns out, authors have not been claiming that it is the
precise policies of in￿ ation, ￿scal stance or trade liberalization that make aid
bene￿cial. Instead, the idea would be that a country that chooses the right
macro policies will also be a good manager of foreign aid. Best practice in
one area should be correlated with best practice in other areas.
But should it? A key di⁄erence between responsible macroeconomic poli-
cies and good management of foreign aid is the group of people that bene￿ts
from them. While macroeconomic policies will end up improving the lot of
everyone in the economy, foreign aid is often directed towards the very poor
and therefore good aid management will be disproportionately bene￿cial to
the lowest part of the income distribution. While the interests of the govern-
4In this respect, Boone (1996) shows that aid tends to ￿nance consumption instead of
investment.
5ment and the poor might be aligned when it comes to chose macroeconomic
policies, the situation can be the exact opposite at the moment of using for-
eign aid. Thus, good policies and aid mismanagement might well coexist in
a country. Furthermore, the determining factor would be the attitudes of the
people in the government, once again the elite.
The role of the elite has been studied in several theoretical contribu-
tions. Boone (1996) and Adam and O￿ Connell (1999) use a similar theoret-
ical framework to show that an "elitist" political regime will waste foreign
aid, meaning that it will allocate aid to consumption instead of investment.
Even dimmer outcomes are present in the models of Svensson (2000) and
Economides et al. (2004), where the rent-seeking behavior of parts of the
population increases when the amount of funds that can be appropriated is
enlarged by aid funds. This shifts resources away from productive uses and
can result in a net loss for the economy.
These theoretical treatments of the role of the elite do not have a proper
counterpart in the empirical literature. The reason might lie in the di¢ culty
to measure not whether an elite exists (since it is always the case that some
groups have more political and economic power than others) but whether this
elite will re￿ ect the interests of all the society or only of its own members.
Researchers have addressed the problem at least indirectly, by estimating
the e⁄ect of democracy (Svensson 1999) or political instability (Chauvet
and Guillaumont 2002) on aid e⁄ectiveness. But these variables are at best
loosely correlated with the presence of an extractive elite. It is not di¢ cult
to come up with examples where, despite the regular holding of elections,
political power remained in a handful of people. Similarly, a stable political
environment might be the outcome of an unchallenged dominance of a small
group.
A central contribution of our paper is to use the percentage of European
6settlers to total population in colonial times as a proxy for the existence of
an extractive elite. As is well-known, colonialism sent waves of Europeans
throughout most of today￿ s developing world in di⁄erent amounts. Where
Europeans settled in few numbers, they tended to leave once the country
became independent. On the other hand, in the countries of high Euro-
pean settlement most economic resources and political power remained in
the hands of European descendants after independence and in general until
today. Historical accounts, like Engerman and Sokolo⁄(2002) for the Amer-
icas, reveal that this type of elite repeatedly put its own interests before
those of the rest of the population and that this phenomenon is prevalent
even today.
Thus, we hypothesize a negative relationship between the amount of Eu-
ropean settlement and the e⁄ectiveness of aid. Remark that we are nowhere
suggesting that European settlement is the most important, let alone the
only, factor determining the existence of an "extractive" elite. We use Euro-
pean settlement because, in addition to being a reasonable proxy for this type
of elite, it has the important characteristic of being historically determined
and therefore much less prone to endogeneity problems than most other vari-
ables. We do not believe that countries of high European immigration are
the only ones a⁄ected by this problem, we simply propose that using the
percentage of European settlers as a regressor will help us identify the e⁄ect
of an extractive elite on aid e⁄ectiveness.
We provide strong empirical support for our thesis by showing that the
e⁄ect of aid on growth tends to be much diminished in countries of high Eu-
ropean settlement. This result holds over a large battery of robustness checks
where we consider di⁄erent regression speci￿cations, di⁄erent measures of aid
and challenge our results by including many of the control variables previ-
ously proposed in the literature.
Our approach links this paper not only with the aid e⁄ectiveness literature
7but also with a growing set of papers studying the e⁄ects of colonialism on
economic outcomes. This line of research has provided evidence on how the
colonial past can explain today￿ s di⁄erences in income levels (Acemoglu et
al. 2001, 2002, Feyrer and Sacerdote 2006) or inequality (Angeles 2006).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we
present in detail our empirical methodology and describe the data. Section
3 reports our results and their implications. In section 4, we conduct the
robustness tests of the benchmark ￿ndings. The last section of the paper
o⁄ers some concluding remarks.
2 Methodology and Data
2.1 Methodology
Our main interest is to examine the growth impact of aid conditional upon
the behavior of the local elite. In other words, we investigate to what extent
local elites, political and/or economic, by mis-directing aid funds to non-
productive (and self-bene￿ting) uses diminish the growth-enhancing e⁄ect of
foreign assistance. Although the rationale behind this idea is also present
in Boone (1996), our methodological approach diverts in a signi￿cant way.
By proxying the local elites as the percentage of European settlers to total
population in colonial times, we can capture the adverse e⁄ect these elites
impose on the growth-e⁄ectiveness of aid.
The majority of today￿ s aid-recipient countries were colonized. The cen-
tral hypothesis of this paper is that the Europeans who settled in the colo-
nized countries evolved into a powerful local elite and that the in￿ uence of
these elites is related to the extent of European settlement. Thus, in coun-
tries where the percentage of European settlers was well below 1% most of
the land and productive resources remained in the hands of the autochtho-
nous people. Europeans were simply not numerous enough to directly run
8the economy and pro￿ted instead by means of taxes and commerce. On the
other hand, in the countries where Europeans settlers accounted for a large
minority of 20-30% of the population they took direct control of all land and
mining resources, along with all political power.5,6
We advance that this elite has played a primal role in the receipt and
allocation of foreign ￿nancial assistance and has consistently put its own
interests in front of those of the rest of the country. Aid e⁄ectiveness should
then be negatively related to the importance of this elite, as proxied by our
colonialism-related variables.
We test our central hypothesis by complying to the current trend in the
related literature and utilize panel data techniques. Speci￿cally, we employ
the following model speci￿cation:
git = ￿+￿1Aidit+￿2Settlersit+￿3(Aid
￿Settlers)it+
m X
j=1
￿jXj;it+
n X
k=1
￿kDk;it+uit;
(1)
where git denotes per capita GDP growth rate in country i at time t,
Aid represents a measure of aid receipts, and Settlers is the percentage
of European settlers in total population in colonial times for all aid recip-
ient countries. For non-colonized countries Settlers takes the value of 0.
Xj;it describes a list of control variables that are commonly found to explain
a substantial variation in the data. These are the logarithm of initial in-
come, an indicator of institutional quality from the International Country
Risk Guide, the fraction of land in the tropics, indicators of ￿scal (budget
5See Angeles (forthcoming) for a more extended discussion of this topic.
6Note that there exist four colonies were Europeans became the majority of the pop-
ulation: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US. In this case it would be wrong to
talk about Europeans constituting an elite since an elite should be formed by a minority
of the population. If these countries were included in our dataset we would need to set
them in a separate group. But this is not the case since they are not aid-recipients.
9balance), monetary (in￿ ation), and trade (Sachs-Warner openness) policies,
and a proxy for political instability. Finally, Dk;it are the dummies controlling
for regional di⁄erences (Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia).
A negative value of the coe¢ cient ￿3 would indicate that the growth
e⁄ects of aid are reduced in countries were European settlement was relatively
large in colonial times. We will take this as evidence of the negative role of
an extractive elite on aid e⁄ectiveness.
The panel estimations we use are based on techniques that address pos-
sible endogeneity of the right-hand-side variables. The ￿rst method is a
standard two stage least squares estimation (2SLS). The instruments we use
can be categorized into lags of potentially endogenous variables and into
additional exogenous variables. Consistent with the literature, we consider
one lag of the endogenous variables as instruments. The exogenous variables
used to instrument for aid are drawn from Hansen and Tarp (2001), Burnside
and Dollar (2000), and Clemens et al. (2004). These are a dummy for the
Franc zone, a dummy for Central American countries, a dummy for Egypt,
arms imports relative to total imports lagged one period, the logarithm of
population, and M2 as a fraction of GDP lagged one period.
The second method is the system GMM estimation developed by Blundell
and Bond (1998) and popularized in the aid-growth literature by Dalgaard
et al. (2004) and Roodman (2004). This technique eliminates the impact
of time invariant and slowly changing variables, such as regional dummies
and institutions, while it accounts for possible endogeneity by a rich set
of endogenous instruments. This estimator treats the model as a system of
equations, in ￿rst-di⁄erences and in levels, where the endogenous variables in
the ￿rst-di⁄erence equations are instrumented with lags of their levels and the
endogenous variables in the level equations are instrumented with lags of their
￿rst di⁄erences. A di¢ culty associated with system GMM, however, has to do
with the choice of the number of lags of the endogenous and predetermined
10variables. For instance, Dalgaard et al. (2004) starting with twice lagged
endogenous regressors use an unrestricted set of lags, while Reddy and Minoiu
(2006) prefer ￿ve time periods of lags. In addition, Rajan and Subramanian
(2005) have shown the fragility of some of the results by simply limiting the
number of lags of the instrumented endogenous and predetermined variables
from unrestricted to three.
To enhance the robustness of our results and to avoid this kind of criti-
cism, we follow Roodman (2004) and Rajan and Subramanian (2005) in the
way we set the lags to be used for instrumentation in our system GMM esti-
mation. Originally, similar to Dalgaard et al. (2004) we use unrestricted lags
starting with two, and thereafter we drop the size of the maximum lags to
three. Finally, acknowledging Roodman￿ s (2004) comment that the number
of instruments we use could be too large that "they can over￿t the instru-
mented variables, biasing the results towards those of the OLS", we restrict
the number of instruments to be less than the number of countries in the
regression. However, instead of reducing directly the lags of the endogenous
instruments we collapse the instruments.7
Both the instrumental variable approaches we use to estimate the dimin-
ishing e⁄ect of aid on growth due to the presence of the local elite are tested
for the validity of the used instruments with two speci￿cation tests. First,
Hansen￿ s (1982) J test of over-identifying restrictions is employed to examine
the exogeneity of the instruments. It is worth mentioning that this test is
consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of any
pattern.8 Second, with regard to serial correlation, taking into account the
bias it can cause to both the coe¢ cients and the standard errors, we check
7As the Stata manual states, this means that instead of creating one instrument for
each time period, variable, and lag distance, we create one instrument for each variable
and lag distance.
8Failure of the null hypothesis suggests that the set of instruments is incomplete im-
plying omitted variables bias.
11all of our regressions for ￿rst and second order degree with the Arellano and
Bond (1991) test. When ￿rst-order serial correlation is present, we use clus-
tered standard errors by country making them robust to serial correlation.
In addition, to avoid dynamic panel bias we instrument for regressors that
are not strictly exogenous. These include initial income, institutional qual-
ity, openness, budget balance, and in￿ ation. For the system GMM, however,
since ￿rst-di⁄erencing induces ￿rst-order serial correlation in the transformed
errors, the appropriate check regards only the absence of second-order serial
correlation.
We also complement the above tests and checks of our methodological ap-
proach with a procedure that identi￿es multiple outliers (Hadi 1992). These
outliers correspond to the partial scatter of growth with the multiplicative
regressor Aid￿Settlers. This allows us to investigate whether our relation-
ship of interest is a⁄ected by some observations that carry an excess weight.
Note, however, that this technique is applicable only in the 2SLS framework
since there is no comparable procedure in the GMM setting.
As discussed, the estimation techniques that we use account for the po-
tential endogeneity of our aid measures and of a set of the control variables
Xj;it. One variable that we do not instrument for, however, is Settlers. This
requires that the number of European settlers in the colonies were not a func-
tion of the rate of economic growth today nor of any variable a⁄ecting growth
today that is omitted in equation (1). Fortunately, we can be reasonably con-
￿dent that this condition is met. The pattern of European settlement was
certainly a⁄ected by factors that can be related to present-day growth, like
climate (see Gallup et al. 1999) and institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2001); but
equation (1) includes both climate and institutions as control variables. And
surely one would not argue that European settlers were so foresighted as to
make their decision to move into a colony in the 19th century or before based
on this colony￿ s rate of economic growth during the late 20th century.
122.2 Data Sources
We investigate our hypothesis by adopting the data set developed by Rood-
man (2004), which depends heavily on that of Easterly et al. (2004). It covers
171 aid recipient countries over the period 1958-2001. This set has been com-
piled in order to test the robustness of many of the results established in the
aid-growth literature. Therefore, it is the most comprehensive data set not
only in terms of country and period coverage, but also with respect to the
breadth of regressors and instruments used. It contains three measures of aid
receipts that allow us to test the robustness of our argument. These are e⁄ec-
tive development assistance (EDA)-to-real GDP, net overseas development
assistance (ODA)-to-exchange rate GDP, and ODA-to-real GDP.9 Unless we
state otherwise the measure we use is EDA-to-real GDP. In addition, the
data set brings together a large set of variables that have been found in the
past to a⁄ect the impact of aid on economic growth (e.g., climate, economic
policies, political instability, vulnerability of economic environment, etc). In
this way, we have a natural benchmark of studies to compare our ￿ndings
and claims against.
We expand the above mentioned data set with data on European settle-
ment in colonial times drawn from Angeles (2006, Table 1) which, in turn,
are mainly based on Etemad (2000) and McEvedy and Jones (1978). This
data constitutes our prime proxy for the size and importance of an extractive
elite. We also provide an alternative proxy for the elite: the descendants of
the original European settlers as a percentage of total population in present
times.10 This allows us to control whether our results are robust to di⁄erent
9For a detailed description of these measures, see Roodman (2004).
10The source for this measure is the CIA World Factbook 2006. Note that in the
case of Latin American countries the exercice is complicated by the large extent of racial
mixture. The only way through this di¢ culty is by compromising: we calculate the
percentage of European descendants as the percentage of people of white race plus one
half the percentage of people classi￿ed as "mestizo" (mixed white and amerindian races)
or "mulatto" (mixed white and black).
13ways of measuring the weight of the elite.
Data availability determines the set of countries we can include in our
regressions. We cover up to 76 countries and the data are averaged over 11
four-year intervals (1958-61 to 1998-2001).
3 Benchmark Findings
We begin our analysis by estimating equation (1) with simple OLS where the
set of control variables is as described above. At this stage we examine the
non-linear impact of aid on growth conditional on the presence of the local
elite without controlling for the possible endogeneity of aid. As we move
to the right of Table 1 we progressively allow more regressors to be endoge-
nous. The results in column (1) are not surprising as to the in￿ uence the
variables included in sets Xj and Dk are found to exert on economic growth.
Speci￿cally, apart from the evidence of conditional convergence, location in
Sub-Saharan Africa, a higher fraction of land in the tropics, higher in￿ ation,
and greater political instability are associated with slower growth. Being
situated in East Asia and having a higher institutional quality indicator, on
the other hand, are conducive to faster economic growth. We also ￿nd that
although running a budget surplus and being more open to international
transactions are bene￿cial to growth, are not so to a statistically signi￿cant
degree. Turning our attention to the variables of interest, we ￿nd strong ev-
idence in support of our main thesis. Aid is found to have a positive impact
on growth. However, this impact is diminished by the presence of the local
elite as indicated by the negative and strongly signi￿cant estimate of the aid
interaction term.
In columns (2) to (4) we apply 2SLS and instrument for the potentially
endogenous regressors. These are limited to Aid and Aid￿Settlers in column
(2) and expanded to initial income, institutional quality, openness, budget
14balance, and in￿ ation in column (3). Controlling for endogeneity improves
the ￿t of the regression without dramatically altering the results. The only
di⁄erence is that it renders aid insigni￿cant, although still with a positive
coe¢ cient. All the other coe¢ cients are similar in magnitude and signi￿cance
across the two regressions. This holds in particular for the multiplicative
term that describes the conditional e⁄ect of aid on growth. The speci￿cation
tests acknowledge the validity of the instruments since Hansen￿ s (1982) J
statistic cannot reject their exogeneity at the 5% level. In addition, the
Arellano-Bond (1991) test, although rejecting the hypothesis of no ￿rst-order
serial correlation in the error term just for regression (2), fails to reject the
hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation in both regressions at the 5%
level.
Column (4) shows that our ￿ndings are not driven by outliers. The Hadi
(1992) procedure classi￿es 10 observations as outliers (listed at the bottom
of Table 1). Removing these observations strengthens the ￿t of the model,
improves substantially the explanatory power of the instruments, and leaves
the results intact.
In columns (5) to (7) we adopt an alternative instrumental estimation
approach, which has been deemed to be superior to 2SLS, the system GMM.
As in Daalgard et al. (2004), we remove by ￿rst di⁄erencing the impact of
time invariant factors (dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia, frac-
tion of land in the tropics, and settlers) and variables that change very slowly
(institutional quality and political instability). In this way, all included re-
gressors are considered to be potentially endogenous and are controlled for
with their lagged levels as instruments.
Regression (5) uses all possible lags of the endogenous variables as instru-
ments starting from the second lag, while regression (6) limits the maximum
number of lags to three. Finally, regression (7) uses the same set of lags as
15regression (5) but collapses the set, as in Roodman (2004). Using this esti-
mation procedure continues to support our underlying conclusions. That is,
the results highlight the negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cients of Aid￿Settlers
regardless of the number of instruments used. In addition, these results are
found to be consistent while the e⁄ect of aid, along with openness and budget
surplus seem to be now signi￿cantly positive. The ￿nal point to note from
our benchmark ￿ndings in Table 1, is that the coe¢ cient in our variable of
interest is fairly stable along the di⁄erent regressions, even though we use
a variety of estimation techniques and di⁄erent sets and number of instru-
ments. The task of the next section is to treat the robustness of our ￿ndings
in a more detailed manner.
4 Robustness of the Benchmark Findings
This section examines the sensitivity of our baseline results by conducting
the following three exercises. First, we consider alternative estimation speci-
￿cations regarding the incorporation of the local elite and also use a di⁄erent
measure of its size to examine the validity of our ￿ndings. Second, we carry
out regressions with alternative measures of aid. Finally, we explore the ro-
bustness and strength of our results vis-Æ-vis a wide number of prominent
aid-growth studies by jointly considering the aid interaction e⁄ects they pro-
pose along with ours. Our basic ￿nding survives all these tests and clearly
indicates the importance of the local elite as a determinant of the e⁄ectiveness
of foreign aid in the growth prospects of developing countries.
4.1 Alternative Speci￿cation and Measures of Local
Elite
As explained before, our regressions include both colonized and non-colonized
countries; non-colonized countries simply take the value of 0 for Settlers.
This speci￿cation might not be the best since countries that were colonized
16and received few settlers (variable Settlers close to 0) and non-colonized
countries (Settlers=0) are assumed to be almost the same ceteris paribus.
One might expect instead that colonialism would have an impact even in
the cases of very limited settlement. The criticism can be extended to sug-
gest that the extent of European settlement might not matter and that our
variable Settlers is just picking up the e⁄ect of being colonized.
We take this issue seriously and propose two ways to deal with it. First,
we modify our original speci￿cation to treat colonized and non-colonized
countries separately. The ￿rst regression we run is described by:
git = ￿ + ￿1Aidit + ￿2Settlersit + ￿3(Aid
￿Settlers)it + ￿4NonSetit (2)
+￿5(Aid
￿NonSet)it +
m X
j=1
￿jXj;it +
n X
k=1
￿kDk;it + uit;
where NonSet is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for those coun-
tries in the set that have not been colonized, and all other variables are as
de￿ned in equation (1). Thus, if aid e¢ ciency really di⁄ers in the countries
that were never colonies this should show up in the coe¢ cient ￿5.
The second method we use is simply to keep the speci￿cation in (1) but to
restrict the set of countries to those that have had a colonization experience
in the past.
Table 2 presents the estimates of these speci￿cations.11 They appear in
columns (2) and (3) respectively, while column (1) reproduces the second
column of Table 1 with the original measure of settlers to ease comparison.
The results continue to support our thesis: the coe¢ cient of Aid￿Elite is
negative and signi￿cant in both regressions (though only at the 10% level in
column 2). The coe¢ cient of Aid￿NonSet in regression (2) appears to be not
11Note that in this table we have a variable called Elite in the place of Settlers. This
is because in this table we use di⁄erent proxys for the elite. Thus, on columns 1 to 3
Elite=Settlers, while on columns 4 and 5 Elite=Descendants (see main text).
17statistically signi￿cant. This result can be interpreted as bringing support
to our thesis: colonized countries with low European settlement do not di⁄er
signi￿cantly from non colonized ones. Thus, it is the presence of settlers that
makes colonialism problematic for aid e¢ ciency because it creates a powerful
local elite.
Another criticism that one might have towards our approach is that the
size of the Europeans in total population might have changed considerably
between colonial times and the present. The correct variable to look at
would then be the percentage of the population of European descendants,
measured today. We investigate this by considering another proxy for the
local elite: the percentage of the population that is of European descendent
today (Descendants). While we welcome this as an opportunity to test the
robustness of our hypothesis to a di⁄erent proxy for the elite it must also be
noted that there are also reasons for not preferring this measure to the one
we have used until now. While it is true that the percentage of descendants
refers to present times one must also be aware that many of the European
descendants might be regarded more as a middle class than as an elite. This is
particularly true in Latin America, where a large proportion of the population
is actually of mixed race (European and Amerindian or European and Black)
and where in some cases the European descendants became the vast majority
of the country (e.g., Argentina, Chile and Uruguay).
With these complications in mind, we o⁄er two alternative speci￿cations
with the Descendants variable. In the ￿rst we simply use Descendants in-
stead of Settlers in equation (1). The second takes into account that in
some countries the descendants cannot constitute an elite because they have
become the majority of the population:
git = ￿+￿1Aidit+￿2Descendantsit+￿3(Aid
￿Descendants)it+￿4HighDescit
(3)
18+￿5(Aid
￿HighDesc)it +
m X
j=1
￿jXj;it +
n X
k=1
￿kDk;it + uit;
where HighDesc is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when European
descendants constitute the largest proportion of the population.12
The results of these regressions are given in columns (4) and (5) of Ta-
ble 2 respectively. The use of the alternative proxy for local elite does not
change our conclusions in any meaningful way. The aid-elite interaction co-
e¢ cient remains negative and signi￿cant in both regressions and its value
and signi￿cance increases when we account for the countries with high frac-
tions of descendants.13 This last ￿nding is in accordance with our prior that
European descendants are also part of the middle class in the countries with
HighDesc=1. When we do not treat these countries separately the coef-
￿cient ￿3 is smaller because these countries have a higher aid-e⁄ectiveness
than what one would expect given their level of descendants.
To summarize, our alternative regression equations and additional mea-
sures of the local elite do not seem to alter the main ￿nding of our analysis.
Moreover, the change in the magnitude of the aid-elite interaction term is
intuitively appealing and accords well with our expectations. Finally, note
that the results are preserved when we also control for outliers using the Hadi
(1992) procedure (not shown, but available upon request).
4.2 Alternative Measures of Aid
In all preceding analysis we have used EDA-to-real GDP (as in Burnside and
Dollar 2000, Collier and Dehn 2001, Dalgaard et al. 2004) as our preferred
measure of aid ￿ ows. The literature, however, includes two more measures:
12These countries are Argentina (97%), Brazil (72.95%), Chile (89.5%), Puerto Rico
(80.5%), and Uruguay (92%).
13This illustrates that Descendants is not an inappropriate alternative proxy for elite
size, given that the correlation between Settlers and Descendants is 0.83.
19net ODA-to-real GDP (Clemens et al. 2004 and Rajan and Subramanian
2005) and net ODA-to-GDP converted to dollars using market exchange
rates (Hansen and Tarp 2001 and Guillaumont and Chauvet 2001). Table 3
depicts simple correlations between these three measures of aid and shows
that they are highly correlated. Therefore, switching between aid measures
is not expected to have a substantial impact on the benchmark results.
This expectation is echoed in the results shown in Table 4. There appear
three regressions per alternative measure of aid, and as Table 1, increasingly
more variables are controlled for endogeneity as we move to the right. All
six regressions describe a signi￿cant and fairly stable coe¢ cient for the aid-
settlers interaction variable, although the degree of signi￿cance drops at the
10% level for the two system GMM estimations. One important di⁄erence,
however, between these regressions, that use ODA, and the ones in Table 1,
that use EDA, is that now in 5 of the 6 regressions the direct e⁄ect of aid
on growth is found to be positive and signi￿cant. The way aid is measured,
could therefore be a signi￿cant characteristic in assessing the potential growth
bene￿ts of foreign aid. This, however, does not in￿ uence the idea we advance
in this paper.14 It is also worthwhile to mention that the ￿ndings of Table 4
remain unchanged even when we use the alternative estimation speci￿cations
and measures of elite as advanced in the previous section.
4.3 Comparison with the Recent Empirical Literature
In the voluminous literature that tackles the relationship between aid and
growth, one can distinguish two types of studies that support aid e⁄ective-
ness. Those that claim that aid has on average a positive but diminishing
growth impact independent of any country characteristics, and those that
14An additional result that emerges from the speci￿cation tests, described in the method-
ological section, is that as we instrument for more endogenous variables the Arellano-Bond
(1991) test fails to reject the hypothesis of no ￿rst-order serial correlation in the error term
even at the 10% level (columns (2) and (5)).
20suggest that the e⁄ectiveness of aid hinges upon such characteristics. The
￿rst strand of studies includes, among others, Hadjimichael et al. (1995),
Durbarry et al. (1998), Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), and Clemens et
al. (2004), while the "conditional" strand became richer in recent years by
providing a wide range of intuitively palatable characteristics. These have
been represented by macro indicators, such as in￿ ation, budget balance, and
openness (Burnside and Dollar 2000); export price shocks (Collier and Dehn
2001); political instability (Chauvet and Guillaumont 2002); warfare and
policy (Collier and Hoe› er 2002); democracy (Svensson 1999, Kosack 2002);
and climatic circumstances (Dalgaard et al. 2004). This section examines the
validity of our ￿ndings by including the aid-elite interaction term in a wide
set of regressions that represent these alternative aid-growth relationships
that have been advanced in the literature.
Table 5a demonstrates this process by focusing on the policy environment
suggested by Burnside and Dollar (2000), BD from now on, and used in an
extended data set by Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004), ELR. Column
(1) reproduces the BD main result, where aid by itself is not signi￿cant (even
has a negative coe¢ cient) but the aid-policy interaction term is positive and
signi￿cant.15 In column (2), we add our aid-elite interaction term (along
with elite) to the BD speci￿cation and as in our benchmark results we ￿nd
it to be negative and signi￿cant. The aid-policy term is also found to be
greater in magnitude and signi￿cance compared to the original BD regres-
sion. We then include in the dataset the ￿ve observations that have been
deemed as outliers in BD, and we observe in column (3) that although the
aid-policy coe¢ cient is reduced by ten-fold and becomes insigni￿cant, the
aid-elite coe¢ cient remains large and signi￿cant.
15Note that this regression corresponds to Table 4, column (5) of BD, where ￿ve outliers
have been excluded from the sample (Gambia 1986-89, 1990-93; Guyana 1990-93; and
Nicaragua 1986-89, 1990-93). As in ELR, if we include these observations the signi￿cance
of the aid-policy term breaks down.
21Columns (4) to (6) follow the same pattern as (1) to (3), but now the
data set is that of ELR, who have updated and extended the BD set. We use
the full sample over 1970-1997 and ￿nd, in accordance with ELR, that in all
regressions both the aid and the aid-policy coe¢ cients enter insigni￿cantly.
Therefore, once more the BD ￿nding is proven to be fragile to the use of
additional data. Our result, however, is robust and the estimated coe¢ cient
of Aid￿Settlers is pretty stable and becomes signi￿cant at the 5% level when
the data set includes the outliers.
Table 5b presents more regressions of the comparison of our main ￿nding
with the recent literature. From this point forward, however, we do not
use the model speci￿cation that each study utilizes but we return to our
preferred growth model. Columns (1) to (3) turn to the results of Dalgaard
et al. (2004), DHT, where climatic di⁄erences play the central role in the
e⁄ectiveness of aid. Based on Roodman￿ s (2004) data set, we have managed
to obtain DHT￿ s main ￿nding even with a di⁄erent control set. This appears
in column (1), where aid is found to have a negative impact on growth in the
tropics.16 Columns (2) and (3) amend the regression equations with the elite
and the aid-elite terms, and regression (3) also extends the sample to all the
available observations from Roodman￿ s set (2004). We observe that the aid-
elite term is consistently negatively signi￿cant at the 5% level, corroborating
our thesis. Moreover, the direct e⁄ect of aid on growth now becomes greater
and signi￿cant, and the aid-tropics term turns to insigni￿cant and much
smaller in size. These results may imply that our measure of the local elite
could represent a better proxy for deep structural characteristics, such as
institutions, compared to the climatic circumstances.
Regressions (4) and (5) incorporate the aid-elite term in the Collier and
16By using their instruments, these results are very close to Table 3, column (2) of DHT,
where they also control only for the endogeneity of aid and the aid interaction term. We
obtain similar results if we alternatively use as instruments the ones that appear at the
bottom of column (2), Table 5b.
22Dehn (2001), CD, speci￿cation. CD examine the provision of aid as a function
of the export shocks that hit aid recipient countries. They conclude that
well-timed aid increases have a bene￿cial e⁄ect on the impact of negative
export shocks on growth. Our ￿ndings support their results since in all our
related regressions the ￿Aid￿Negative Shock coe¢ cient proves to be positive
and signi￿cant. As far as it concerns our interaction term of interest, the
Aid￿Settlers coe¢ cient continues to be negative and signi￿cant at the 5%
level.17
This is also the case in regression (6), where we utilize the Chauvet and
Guillaumont (2002), CG, speci￿cation, who, among other things, examine
the extent to which aid e⁄ectiveness is in￿ uenced by political instability. No-
tice in particular the high value of the estimated Aid￿Settlers coe¢ cient.
However, in contrast to their results, we ￿nd that aid given to politically
unstable countries is e⁄ective since political instability could be considered
as a form of economic vulnerability, so that aid contributes in ameliorating
its e⁄ects. In addition, again in contrast to CG, we ￿nd the political insta-
bility variable to be signi￿cant and to increase substantially in size with the
addition of the aid-political instability interaction term.18
The ￿nal table that contrasts our main argument with ￿ndings of the
existing literature is Table 5c. In regression (1) we include aid squared in
accordance to Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), HT, to see if this will change
our main ￿nding. The aid-elite term enters signi￿cantly with the correct
sign, while there is no evidence of diminishing returns of aid. The following
three regressions are in the spirit of Collier and Hoe› er (2002), CH, who
propose that aid e⁄ectiveness is in￿ uenced by the timing of its distribution
17Regressions (4) and (5) yield similar results if we use instead the pooled distribution
of forecasting errors for the commodity export price index. For more details see Roodman
(2004).
18Note that these discrepancies in the results could be due to the di⁄erent measurement
of political instability and of the size of our sample, which is at least twice as large as their
sample. See CG￿ s Table 2 for more details.
23as expressed by the number of years following the end of a civil war. By
using three dummies that capture the time that elapsed from civil war, they
suggest that aid is bene￿cial during the ￿rst post-con￿ ict decade but not
immediately after (￿rst three years) the end of the con￿ ict.19 Our results in
columns (2) to (4) con￿rm their conclusions as shown by the positive and
signi￿cant coe¢ cients of aid interacted with the post-con￿ ict 1 and post-
con￿ ict 2 dummies and also by the statistically insigni￿cant coe¢ cient of the
aid-peace onset term. In addition, notice the constancy and signi￿cance at
the 5% level of the Aid￿Settlers coe¢ cient.20
The last two columns of Table 5c illustrate the validity of our ￿ndings
in comparison to Svensson (1999). He uses the degree of political and civil
liberties in recipient countries to show that aid is e⁄ective in more democratic
countries. Our results are not supportive of his ￿ndings, however, since both
indicators of democracy yield insigni￿cant coe¢ cients both for democracy
itself and for democracy interacted with aid. But in both cases our aid-elite
multiplicative term has the correct sign and is highly signi￿cant. A potential
explanation is that our measure of elite encapsulates political power and the
dominance of a small group of people in a more adequate manner than the
institutionalized check the two democracy indicators are supposed to impose
on governmental power. Therefore, the inclusion of the aid-elite term in the
regressions deems the aid-democracy coe¢ cients insigni￿cant.
In sum, our basic ￿nding that the e⁄ectiveness of foreign aid is much di-
minished by the misuse of funds by an "extractive" local elite, has not been
invalidated even when we use a series of estimation speci￿cations that take
into account a large number of explanations generated in the existing litera-
ture. This means that our main argument either provides a complementary
19The three dummies are: peace onset, that assumes a value of 1 if a con￿ ict ended in
that period (which also includes the immediate post-con￿ ict years), and post-con￿ ict 1
(2), that takes a value of 1 one (two) year(s) after civil war has ended.
20We follow Roodman (2004) and include in our regressions only the Aid￿Post-Conflict
dummy and not the triple interaction term Aid￿Post-Conflict￿Policy.
24explanation to some of the already existing ones (Collier and Dehn 2001;
Collier and Hoe› er 2002), or it constitutes a better representation of some
of the variables used to capture speci￿c characteristics of recipient countries
(Burnside and Dollar 2000; Dalgaard et al. 2004; Svensson 1999). Finally,
note that the results presented in Table 5 (b, c) do not limit themselves in
the use of EDA/real GDP as a measure of aid. Quantitatively similar results
were also obtained with the two additional measures: ODA/real GDP and
ODA/exchange rate GDP (available upon request).
5 Concluding Remarks and Discussion
Our aim in this paper has been to contribute to the large literature on aid
e⁄ectiveness by analyzing the role of a key factor that one would readily
admit as important but might deem too di¢ cult to measure: the local elite.
The existence of an elite is not to be regarded as a negative thing by itself.
It is the particular circumstances and motivations that can make this part of
the population to behave in a manner that is bene￿cial only for the minority.
Thus the term "extractive" elite.
A strength of the paper is to identify a set of circumstances in which the
elite of the country turned out to be of the extractive type and, more to
the point of our discussion, would tend to divert ￿ ows of foreign aid for its
own bene￿t. These circumstances are: having a colonial past and receiving
a relatively large amount of European settlers. Of course this should not be
understood as implying that only Europeans form extractive elites in devel-
oping countries. It just happens that, colonialism being such a widespread
phenomenon and the technological and military advantage of Europe over
other regions being so large at the time, this particular pattern can be found
in several cases.
What our empirical analysis shows is that our proxy for the presence
25and strength of an extractive elite, is a very robust explanatory factor of aid
e⁄ectiveness. As we have explained, this continues to hold while we change
speci￿cations, the measure of aid, the proxy for the elite and the list of control
variables and interaction terms with aid. In particular, our thesis holds when
we control for many of the other factors that have been associated with aid
e⁄ectiveness in the literature.
The empirical results give con￿dence to our claim in this paper: that the
elite￿ s attitudes are of ￿rst importance for the bene￿ts that can be obtained
(or forgone) from foreign aid.
Recent views on foreign aid in the relevant policy circles stress the im-
portance of targeting aid. That is, if we identify the factors that predict high
aid e⁄ectiveness then we should concentrate aid ￿ ows in the countries where
these factors are present. If we are to interpret our results in these terms, the
outcome would hardly be encouraging. Indeed, the variable we use to iden-
tify extractive elites is historically determined; countries cannot get rid of it.
Using this variable to enlarge an imaginary "check list" that countries must
go through in order to receive aid would set aside many countries forever.
But this is not the method we would recommend for targeting aid. Check
lists can be damaging if the evidence behind them is shaky or if the countries
can manipulate their numbers in their favor. Instead, we would just stress
that the importance of the local elite should not be overlooked. There is no
easy way to evaluate this point in practice, but nobody said that proper aid
allocation would be easy. A colonial past with European settlement puts a
country in a "risk group", but societies change and can outgrow this type of
problems. There is just no substitute for a careful examination of a country￿ s
circumstances when deciding on aid allocation.
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29Table 1 
Benchmark Findings 
  (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
2SLS 
(3) 
2SLS 
(4) 
2SLS 
(5) 
GMM-SYS 
(6) 
GMM-SYS 
(7) 
GMM-SYS 
Initial GDP per capita (log)  -0.663 
(0.090) 
-0.777  
(0.085) 
-1.24 
(0.007) 
-1.67 
(0.000) 
0.564 
(0.189) 
0.976 
(0.058) 
2.18 
(0.059) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -2.12 
(0.002) 
-1.98 
(0.006) 
-2.30 
(0.002) 
-2.30 
(0.002) 
   
   
   
   
 
   
     
 
East Asia  2.51 
(0.001) 
2.44 
(0.000) 
2.73 
(0.000) 
2.76 
(0.000) 
Institutional quality  0.267 
(0.010) 
0.366 
(0.001) 
0.394 
(0.004) 
0.492 
(0.001) 
Tropical area  -0.884 
(0.080) 
-1.16 
(0.027) 
-1.10 
(0.013) 
-1.33 
(0.011) 
Openness (Sachs-Warner)  0.035 
(0.908) 
0.042 
(0.886) 
0.277 
(0.463) 
0.103 
(0.797) 
2.31 
(0.001) 
2.25 
(0.002) 
3.28 
(0.000) 
Budget balance  10.05 
(0.105) 
9.30 
(0.123) 
4.06 
(0.617) 
5.36 
(0.514) 
15.83 
(0.012) 
24.92 
(0.000) 
26.02 
(0.060) 
Inflation -2.40  -2.28 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
-1.91 
(0.019) 
-1.96 
(0.039) 
-1.86 
(0.000) 
-1.07 
(0.077) 
-0.478 
(0.548) 
Political instability  -1.91 
(0.005) 
-1.81 
(0.003) 
-1.81 
(0.004) 
-1.47 
(0.025) 
Settlers 0.021  0.017 
(0.322)  (0.440) 
0.033 
(0.191) 
0.041 
(0.123) 
EDA 0.295  0.172 
(0.028)  (0.177) 
0.180 
(0.168) 
-0.079 
(0.714) 
0.150 
(0.190) 
0.333 
(0.011) 
0.848 
(0.011) 
EDA * Settlers  -0.027 
(0.003) 
-0.021 
(0.026) 
-0.029 
(0.002) 
-0.033 
(0.094) 
-0.013 
(0.061) 
-0.014 
(0.048) 
-0.026 
(0.081) 
Countries / Obs  68 / 487  67 / 449  66 / 414  66 / 405  76 / 530  76 / 530  76 / 530 
Number  of  Instruments
 
  -          
             
               
               
               
    
323 147 60
R-square 0.318 0.438 0.434 0.475
Hansen  J-test  (p-value) - 0.305 0.495 0.723 1.000 1.000 0.150
AR(1)  test  (p-value) 0.021 0.007 0.180 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2)  test  p-value 0.386 0.589 0.505 0.367 0.306 0.278 0.274
Additional exogenous 
variables used as 
instruments 
- 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
- - -
No. of lags of endogenous 
variables used as 
instruments          - One One One
Unrestricted 
starting with two 
time lags 
Two and three 
time lags 
Unrestricted 
starting with 
two time lags 
and collapse the 
set 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust and clustered standard errors. Constant term not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. In regression 
(4) multiple outliers to the partial scatter of growth with EDA*settlers are removed using the Hadi (1992) procedure. The 10 outliers are GNB 1986-89; BOL 
1986-89, 1990-93 & 1994-97; JOR 1974-77 & 1978-81; GAB 1974-77; NIC 1990-93, 1994-97, 1998-01. 
 
 Table 2 
Alternative Measures of Local Elite 
 
(1) 
Settlers 
(2) 
Settlers & 
Non-colonized 
(3) 
Positive Values 
of Settlers 
(4) 
Descendants 
(5) 
Descendants 
&  
High-
descendants 
Initial GDP per capita 
(log) 
-0.777  
(0.085) 
-0.628 
(0.240) 
-0.654 
(0.262) 
-0.784 
(0.093) 
-0.870 
(0.118) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.98 
(0.006) 
-2.41 
(0.002) 
-2.75 
(0.000) 
-1.91 
(0.010) 
-1.83 
(0.025) 
East Asia  2.44 
(0.000) 
2.39 
(0.000) 
1.24 
(0.115) 
2.50 
(0.000) 
2.67 
(0.000) 
Institutional quality  0.366 
(0.001) 
0.304 
(0.033) 
0.392 
(0.002) 
0.327 
(0.003) 
0.370 
(0.006) 
Tropical area  -1.16 
(0.027) 
-1.17 
(0.026) 
-0.520 
(0.365) 
-1.07 
(0.037) 
-1.26 
(0.063) 
Openness (Sachs-Warner)  0.042 
(0.886) 
0.149 
(0.638) 
0.235 
(0.517) 
0.204 
(0.503) 
0.198 
(0.523) 
Budget balance  9.30 
(0.123) 
9.01 
(0.136) 
7.46 
(0.232) 
7.65 
(0.216) 
6.76 
(0.271) 
Inflation -2.28 
(0.000) 
-2.31 
(0.000) 
-2.06 
(0.000) 
-2.29 
(0.000) 
-2.31 
(0.000) 
Political instability  -1.81 
(0.003) 
-1.98 
(0.002) 
-1.70 
(0.001) 
-1.86 
(0.001) 
-1.68 
(0.017) 
Elite 0.017 
(0.440) 
0.023 
(0.382) 
0.010 
(0.696) 
0.011 
(0.124) 
0.020 
(0.152) 
EDA  0.172 
(0.177) 
0.559 
(0.225) 
0.373 
(0.241) 
0.133 
(0.389) 
0.168 
(0.301) 
EDA * (Elite)  -0.021 
(0.026) 
-0.040 
(0.098) 
-0.061 
(0.032) 
-0.015 
(0.054) 
-0.019 
(0.021) 
Non-colonized    0.440 
(0.640) 
    
EDA * non-colonized   -0.755 
(0.293) 
    
High-descendants        -0.002 
(0.999) 
EDA * high-descendants        -29.02 
(0.738) 
Countries / Obs  67 / 449  67 / 449  53 / 383  66 / 442  66 / 442 
R-square 0.438  0.401  0.369  0.431  0.419 
Hansen J-test (p-value)  0.305  0.199  0.331  0.346  0.271 
AR(1) test (p-value)  0.007  0.014  0.003  0.008  0.010 
AR(2) test (p-value)  0.589  0.666  0.649  0.582  0.471 
Additional exogenous 
variables used as 
instruments 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
No. of lags of endogenous 
variables used as 
instruments 
One One  One  One One 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust and clustered standard errors. Constant term not reported. Instrumented 
variables are in bold type. 
 
 
 Table 3 
Simple Correlations of Aid Measures 
  EDA/real GDP  ODA/real GDP  ODA/exchange rate GDP 
EDA/real GDP  1.00     
ODA/real GDP  0.95  1.00   
ODA/exchange rate GDP  0.91  0.93  1.00 
Note: correlations correspond to the number of observations in Table 1, column (1) and (2). 
 Table 4 
Alternative Measures of Aid 
    ODAPPPGDP ODAXRGDP 
 (1)  (2) 
2SLS  2SLS 
(3) 
GMM-SYS 
(4) 
2SLS 
(5) 
2SLS 
(6) 
GMM-SYS 
Initial GDP per capita (log)  -0.624 
(0.184) 
-1.16 
(0.012) 
1.54 
(0.061) 
-0.805 
(0.106) 
-1.21 
(0.019) 
1.61 
(0.108) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -2.23 
(0.001) 
-2.45 
(0.001) 
   
   
   
 
   
     
-2.51
(0.004) 
-2.93 
(0.004) 
 
East Asia  2.58 
(0.000) 
2.81 
(0.000) 
2.46
(0.000) 
2.71 
(0.000) 
 
Institutional quality  0.349 
(0.001) 
0.386 
(0.004) 
  0.373 
(0.001) 
0.376 
(0.010) 
 
Tropical area  -1.17 
(0.028) 
-1.33 
(0.010) 
-1.02
(0.079) 
-1.11 
(0.070) 
 
Openness (Sachs-Warner)  -0.017 
(0.955) 
0.510 
(0.471) 
3.19 
(0.00) 
0.069 
(0.830) 
0.258 
(0.529) 
3.01 
(0.004) 
Budget balance  10.37 
(0.074) 
4.87 
(0.537) 
 
18.64 
(0.061) 
9.33 
(0.131) 
7.00 
(0.459) 
20.87 
(0.025) 
Inflation -2.28
(0.000) 
-2.05 
(0.005) 
-1.14 
(0.118) 
-2.14 
(0.000) 
-1.36 
(0.184) 
-0.741 
(0.316) 
Political instability  -1.84 
(0.004) 
-1.82 
(0.005) 
-1.84
(0.001) 
-1.93 
(0.002) 
 
Settlers 0.021  0.039 
(0.371)  (0.134) 
0.040
(0.148) 
0.046 
(0.098) 
 
AID  0.277 
(0.020) 
0.232 
(0.040) 
0.524 
(0.028) 
0.112 
(0.094) 
0.124 
(0.120) 
0.207 
(0.045) 
AID * Settlers  -0.015 
(0.043) 
-0.020 
(0.005) 
-0.018 
(0.087) 
-0.015 
(0.037) 
-0.015 
(0.021) 
-0.006 
(0.099) 
Countries / Obs  67 / 449  66 / 414  76 / 530  67 / 447  66 / 412  76 / 526 
Number  of  Instruments
 
           
         
             
             
             
66 66
R-square 0.436 0.433 0.423 0.418
Hansen  J-test  (p-value) 0.200 0.420 0.159 0.275 0.686 0.113
AR(1)  test  (p-value) 0.005 0.145 0.000 0.003 0.101 0.000
AR(2)  test  p-value 0.486 0.473 0.332 0.306 0.225 0.332
Additional exogenous 
variables used as 
instruments 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
- 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
- 
No. of lags of endogenous 
variables used as 
instruments  One        One
Unrestricted 
starting with two 
time lags and 
collapse the set 
One One
Unrestricted 
starting with two 
time lags and 
collapse the set 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust and clustered standard errors. Constant term not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type.  
 
 
 
 Table 5a 
Comparison with the Recent Literature 
 (1)  (2) 
BD 
Original 
BD 
Amended 
(3) 
BD with 
Outliers 
Amended 
(4) 
ELR 
Original 
Full sample 
1970-97 
(5) 
ELR 
Amended 
Full sample 
1970-97 
(6) 
ELR with 
outliers 
Amended 
Full sample  
1970-97 
Initial GDP per capita (log)  -0.907 
(0.163) 
-0.755 
(0.254) 
-0.758 
(0.211) 
-0.868 
(0.076) 
-1.06 
(0.031) 
-0.382 
(0.536) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.28 
(0.126) 
-3.04 
(0.020) 
-2.46 
(0.032) 
-1.21 
(0.044) 
-2.61 
(0.007) 
-2.73 
(0.004) 
East Asia  1.15 
(0.041) 
1.19 
(0.206) 
0.953 
(0.246) 
1.13 
(0.027) 
0.404 
(0.626) 
0.736 
(0.326) 
Institutional quality  0.664 
(0.000) 
0.341 
(0.130) 
0.383 
(0.063) 
0.322 
(0.009) 
0.180 
(0.375) 
0.158 
(0.384) 
Ethnic fractionalization  -0.725 
(0.372) 
-0.696 
(0.548) 
-1.10 
(0.332) 
-0.472 
(0.525) 
-0.575 
(0.606) 
-0.348 
(0.745) 
Assassinations   
     
       
-0.414
(0.118) 
-0.305 
(0.038) 
-0.346 
(0.036) 
-0.286 
(0.259) 
-0.175 
(0.447) 
-0.186 
(0.330) 
Ethnic fractionalization  * 
assassinations 
0.713 
(0.109) 
0.355 
(0.292) 
0.494 
(0.153) 
0.011 
(0.986) 
-0.248 
(0.692) 
-0.269 
(0.668) 
M2/GDP (lagged)  0.017 
(0.273) 
-0.004 
(0.797) 
0.000 
(0.988) 
0.008 
(0.471) 
-0.009 
(0.550) 
-0.012 
(0.512) 
Policy index  0.735 
(0.000) 
0.621 
(0.017) 
 
0.790 
(0.005) 
1.10 
(0.000) 
1.57 
(0.010) 
1.24 
(0.003) 
Settlers 0.011  -0.004 
(0.802)  (0.892) 
0.006
(0.874) 
-0.001 
(0.965) 
EDA  -0.323 
(0.369) 
0.109 
(0.844) 
0.117 
(0.814) 
-0.494 
(0.350) 
0.353 
(0.706) 
0.538 
(0.352) 
EDA * policy  0.176 
(0.092) 
0.322 
(0.049) 
0.037 
(0.817) 
0.011 
(0.957) 
-0.328 
(0.485) 
-0.189 
(0.403) 
EDA * Settlers  -0.084
(0.094) 
-0.054 
(0.068) 
-0.075
(0.098) 
-0.076 
(0.041) 
Countries / Obs  56 / 270  54 / 263  54 / 268  61 / 345  58 / 326  59 / 337 
R-square  0.448           
             
             
             
0.443 0.429 0.397 0.407 0.411
Hansen  J-test  (p-value) 0.117 0.566 0.309 0.201 0.705 0.693
AR(1)  test  (p-value) 0.213 0.455 0.277 0.032 0.044 0.031
AR(2)  test  p-value 0.904 0.853 0.873 0.142 0.100 0.170
Additional exogenous 
variables used as 
instruments 
As in BD, 
Table 4, Col. 
(5), 2SLS 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, lpoppolicy 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, lpoppolicy 
As in ELR, 
Table 2, Col. (2), 
2SLS, row (5) 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, lpoppolicy 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, lpoppolicy 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust and clustered standard errors (columns 1 and 4 only robust standard errors to replicate original results). 
Constant term and period dummies not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type.  
 
 
 Table 5b 
Comparison with the Recent Literature 
 
(1) 
DHT Original 
(2) 
DHT Amended 
(3) 
DHT 
Amended & 
Extended 
(4) 
CD 
Absolute 
shocks 
(5) 
CD 
Shocks to 
GDP 
(6) 
CG 
Initial GDP per capita 
(log) 
-0.607 
(0.184) 
-0.834 
(0.223) 
-0.949 
(0.065) 
-0.893 
(0.045) 
-1.18 
(0.000) 
-0.784 
(0.121) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.44 
(0.005) 
-2.34 
(0.020) 
-2.32 
(0.011) 
-2.04 
(0.020) 
-2.31 
(0.003) 
-2.23 
(0.012) 
East Asia  1.99 
(0.000) 
2.25 
(0.004) 
2.49 
(0.001) 
2.78 
(0.000) 
2.76 
(0.000) 
2.58 
(0.000) 
Institutional quality  0.289 
(0.027) 
0.273 
(0.086) 
0.385 
(0.003) 
0.348 
(0.001) 
0.378 
(0.000) 
0.329 
(0.005) 
Tropical area  -0.893 
(0.059) 
-0.790 
(0.167) 
-0.887 
(0.100) 
-1.06 
(0.079) 
-1.05 
(0.082) 
-1.10 
(0.069) 
Openness (Sachs-Warner)  0.847 
(0.039) 
0.693 
(0.143) 
0.048 
(0.875) 
0.494 
(0.181) 
0.367 
(0.333) 
0.451 
(0.481) 
Budget balance  7.61 
(0.238) 
7.14 
(0.297) 
8.61 
(0.167) 
7.85 
(0.204) 
9.07 
(0.102) 
5.12 
(0.453) 
Inflation -2.13 
(0.000) 
-2.09 
(0.000) 
-2.11 
(0.000) 
-2.05 
(0.000) 
-2.05 
(0.000) 
-2.07 
(0.003) 
Political instability  -2.44 
(0.000) 
-2.18 
(0.000) 
-1.70 
(0.003) 
-2.03 
(0.002) 
-1.98 
(0.002) 
-7.47 
(0.040) 
Settlers   0.046 
(0.156) 
0.039 
(0.113) 
0.043 
(0.117) 
0.054 
(0.072) 
0.067 
(0.093) 
EDA  0.203 
(0.196) 
0.335 
(0.098) 
0.422 
(0.028) 
0.119 
(0.387) 
0.085 
(0.578) 
0.082 
(0.804) 
EDA * tropical area  -0.450 
(0.029) 
-0.095 
(0.826) 
-0.141 
(0.741) 
    
EDA * Settlers   -0.067 
(0.044) 
-0.062 
(0.044) 
-0.054 
(0.049) 
-0.076 
(0.020) 
-0.115 
(0.030) 
Positive shock       1.84 
(0.094) 
-1.40 
(0.819) 
 
Negative shock       -2.03 
(0.049) 
-7.14 
(0.385) 
 
∆EDA * negative shock       0.049 
(0.000) 
0.028 
(0.026) 
 
∆EDA * positive shock       0.001 
(0.854) 
0.001 
(0.913) 
 
lagged EDA * neg shock       0.009 
(0.060) 
0.006 
(0.404) 
 
lagged EDA * pos shock       0.011 
(0.121) 
0.026 
(0.000) 
 
EDA * political 
instability 
        7.52 
(0.076) 
Countries / Obs  60 / 355  57 / 340  67 / 449  65 / 391  65 / 391  67 / 447 
R-square 0.406  0.395  0.430  0.502  0.519  0.094 
Hansen J-test (p-value)  0.180  0.474  0.333  0.806  0.790  0.412 
AR(1) test (p-value)  0.032  0.014  0.010  0.059  0.084  0.026 
AR(2) test p-value  0.706  0.297  0.316  0.632  0.512  0.745 
Additional exogenous 
variables used as 
instruments 
As in DHT, 
Table 3, Col. 
(2), 2SLS 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
No. of lags of endogenous 
variables used as 
instruments 
 One  One  One  One  One 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust and clustered standard errors. Constant term not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Table 5c 
Comparison with the Recent Literature 
  (1) 
HT 
 
(2) 
CH 
Post-conflict 1 
(3) 
CH 
Post-conflict 2 
(4) 
CH 
Peace onset 
(5) 
Svensson 
Political rights 
(6) 
Svensson 
Civil liberties 
 
Initial GDP per capita 
(log) 
-0.878 
(0.091) 
-0.900 
(0.055) 
-0.926 
(0.059) 
-0.879 
(0.067) 
-0.811 
(0.089) 
-0.755 
(0.118) 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -2.36 
(0.006) 
-2.29 
(0.005) 
-2.22 
(0.003) 
-2.38 
(0.004) 
-2.58 
(0.003) 
-2.70 
(0.002) 
 
East Asia  2.47 
(0.001) 
2.49 
(0.001) 
2.53 
(0.000) 
2.49 
(0.001) 
2.43 
(0.001) 
2.32 
(0.002) 
 
Institutional quality  0.368 
(0.001) 
0.374 
(0.000) 
0.381 
(0.001) 
0.378 
(0.000) 
0.343 
(0.003) 
0.346 
(0.003) 
 
Tropical area  -0.986 
(0.087) 
-0.924 
(0.122) 
-0.943 
(0.109) 
-0.970 
(0.100) 
-1.11 
(0.087) 
-1.02 
(0.114) 
 
Openness (Sachs-
Warner) 
0.069 
(0.821) 
0.019 
(0.951) 
-0.038 
(0.903) 
0.088 
(0.780) 
0.181 
(0.588) 
0.243 
(0.464) 
 
Budget balance  8.69 
(0.159) 
8.51 
(0.169) 
9.08 
(0.141) 
8.15 
(0.196) 
8.35 
(0.157) 
8.07 
(0.176) 
 
Inflation -2.14 
(0.000) 
-2.10 
(0.000) 
-2.08 
(0.001) 
-2.24 
(0.000) 
-1.93 
(0.001) 
-1.94 
(0.000) 
 
Political instability  -1.76 
(0.002) 
-1.71 
(0.003) 
-1.66 
(0.003) 
-1.76 
(0.002) 
-1.80 
(0.005) 
-1.86 
(0.003) 
 
Settlers 0.035 
(0.187) 
0.036 
(0.140) 
0.039 
(0.116) 
0.042 
(0.120) 
0.034 
(0.237) 
0.040 
(0.193) 
 
EDA  0.350 
(0.557) 
0.259 
(0.147) 
0.260 
(0.224) 
0.355 
(0.051) 
0.905 
(0.345) 
1.19 
(0.334) 
 
EDA * Settlers  -0.058 
(0.059) 
-0.062 
(0.014) 
-0.063 
(0.014) 
-0.069 
(0.020) 
-0.065 
(0.044) 
-0.070 
(0.029) 
 
EDA squared  -0.004 
(0.942) 
        
Post-conflict dummy    -0.474 
(0.559) 
1.001 
(0.080) 
0.527 
(0.578) 
    
EDA * post-conflict 
dummy 
 0.640 
(0.000) 
0.378 
(0.030) 
0.377 
(0.407) 
    
Democracy  indicator        0.061 
(0.733) 
0.220 
(0.387) 
 
EDA * democracy 
indicator 
      -0.103 
(0.543) 
-0.158 
(0.475) 
 
Countries / Obs  67 / 449  67 / 449  67 / 449  67 / 449  67 / 381  67 / 381  
R-square  0.428 0.435 0.433  0.424 0.400 0.394   
Hansen  J-test  (p-value)  0.379 0.406 0.360  0.370 0.275 0.284   
AR(1)  test  (p-value)  0.007 0.006 0.004  0.003 0.249 0.221   
AR(2)  test  p-value  0.398 0.391 0.330  0.368 0.245 0.236   
Additional exogenous 
variables used as 
instruments 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
Frz, centam, 
egypt, arms1, 
lpop, m21 
 
No. of lags of 
endogenous variables 
used as instruments 
One One One  One One One   
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust and clustered standard errors. Constant term not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. 
 
 
 